The biggest OT risk isn’t an unpatched PLC — it’s the “helpful” IT integration that quietly turns one compromised credential into plant-floor impact.

As factories, energy, and logistics connect OT to IT for visibility and optimization, the real expansion isn’t endpoints. It’s trust.

Common trust links that attackers chain:
– Shared identity (AD/AAD) extended into OT
– Remote access tooling that reaches “just one” HMI
– Shared monitoring/management platforms with high privileges
– File shares, jump servers, historians, and middleware bridging zones
– Vendor accounts and service credentials that never expire

A practical model for leaders:
1) Map every trust crossing between IT and OT (identity, access paths, data flows, admin tools)
2) Minimize trust: least privilege, separate identities, time-bound access, remove standing vendor creds
3) Segment for failure: assume IT gets owned; design OT so it degrades safely, not catastrophically
4) Monitor the crossings: auth events, remote sessions, tool-to-tool API calls, historian traffic
5) Practice response: OT-aware playbooks, isolation steps, and decision rights before an incident

Convergence delivers value. But every integration is also a contract of trust. Make those contracts explicit, measurable, and breakable.

#ITOT #OTSecurity #CyberSecurity #IndustrialCybersecurity #ZeroTrust #IdentitySecurity #NetworkSegmentation #IncidentResponse

Stop asking “Would my team fall for phishing?” Start asking “What if every employee gets a bespoke pretext built from their public footprint — and it’s updated daily?”

AI is shifting initial access from generic blasts to high-conversion targeting:
– Role-specific lures that mirror real workflows (finance, HR, IT, legal)
– Language and tone matching pulled from public posts, bios, podcasts, press
– Business-context hooks based on vendors, tools, hiring, funding, org changes
– Synthetic voice/video for “quick calls” and realistic meeting invites

This means the control plane has to assume messages, calls, and calendar events can be convincingly synthetic.

Practical controls founders and operators can implement now:
1) Move approvals out of inboxes: payments, bank changes, vendor onboarding require in-app workflows and enforced separation of duties.
2) Add a verification lane: a written callback policy using known-good numbers, plus “no exceptions” for urgency.
3) Lock down identity: phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) for email, VPN, admin, finance systems.
4) Harden email and domains: DMARC enforcement, domain monitoring, strict external sender labeling.
5) Reduce public exhaust: limit org charts, direct emails, tooling details; tighten who can post what.
6) Instrument detection: alert on new inbox rules, OAuth app grants, suspicious calendar invites, and mailbox forwarding.
7) Train for pretexts, not links: scenarios around vendor change requests, recruiter outreach, “CEO needs this now,” and calendar hijacks.

Initial access is becoming a precision sales funnel. Your defenses need the same level of intent.

#cybersecurity #security #AISecurity #socialengineering #phishing #CISO #founders

If you’re only hunting for malware in OT, you’re late.

Assume the move is quiet access.

Nation-state pre-positioning rarely looks like a dramatic intrusion. It often blends into normal admin work: a new remote account, a service tool update, an engineer “helping” with a config change, a vendor connection that never fully goes away.

Then it sits dormant for months.

That dormancy is the point. It gives adversaries optionality when geopolitics shifts: the ability to disrupt, degrade, or coerce on demand, without having to break in under pressure.

Treat this as an access-governance and detection design problem, not a compliance checklist.

Practical tripwires to make stealthy persistence noisy:
– Engineering workstation use: baseline who uses them, when, and for what; alert on rare tools, rare hours, and rare targets
– Remote maintenance: enforce identity, strong session controls, and record/review remote sessions; alert on “always-on” connectivity patterns
– Privilege changes: monitor group membership, new local admins, new service accounts, and credential use across zones
– Identity-to-asset mapping: know which identities can reach which PLCs/HMIs/historians, and make exceptions visible

If an attacker’s best strategy is to remain invisible, your best defense is to make access changes observable.

#OT #ICS #CriticalInfrastructure #CyberSecurity #ThreatHunting #ZeroTrust #IdentitySecurity #IndustrialSecurity

Stop asking “Is our OT patched?”

Start mapping: “What exact IT credential, tool, or vendor session can touch OT today?”

Most OT ransomware incidents don’t begin on a PLC or HMI.
They start in corporate IT and cross the boundary through:
– Shared identities and groups
– Remote access paths (VPN, jump hosts, RMM tools)
– Flat or loosely segmented networks
– Vendor access that bypasses normal controls

So prevention becomes actionable when you treat it as a pathway problem:
1) Inventory every IT-to-OT access path (people, service accounts, tools, vendors)
2) Kill what you don’t need
3) Constrain what remains: least privilege, MFA, time-bound access
4) Hard-segment OT from IT, and segment inside OT (cell/area zones)
5) Monitor and alert on identity-driven access to OT assets

If a stolen IT credential can reach OT, patching OT will never be enough.
Reduce pathways. Reduce blast radius.

#ransomware #otsecurity #icssecurity #cybersecurity #zerotrust #networksegmentation #identitysecurity