Stop asking “Is our OT patched?”

Start mapping: “What exact IT credential, tool, or vendor session can touch OT today?”

Most OT ransomware incidents don’t begin on a PLC or HMI.
They start in corporate IT and cross the boundary through:
– Shared identities and groups
– Remote access paths (VPN, jump hosts, RMM tools)
– Flat or loosely segmented networks
– Vendor access that bypasses normal controls

So prevention becomes actionable when you treat it as a pathway problem:
1) Inventory every IT-to-OT access path (people, service accounts, tools, vendors)
2) Kill what you don’t need
3) Constrain what remains: least privilege, MFA, time-bound access
4) Hard-segment OT from IT, and segment inside OT (cell/area zones)
5) Monitor and alert on identity-driven access to OT assets

If a stolen IT credential can reach OT, patching OT will never be enough.
Reduce pathways. Reduce blast radius.

#ransomware #otsecurity #icssecurity #cybersecurity #zerotrust #networksegmentation #identitysecurity